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The Exclusion of Race from Mandated Continuing 
Legal Education Requirements: A Critical Race 
Theory Analysis 
Lorenzo Bowman, Tonette Rocco, & Elizabeth Peterson1 
 
Forty states mandate continuing legal education (CLE) for practicing 
lawyers in their jurisdictions.2 Lawyers who fail to meet the mandated CLE 
requirements of their jurisdictions are often subject to suspension and, 
ultimately, disbarment. Given the penalty for noncompliance, almost all 
practicing lawyers in these jurisdictions take CLE requirements seriously. 
The complex nature of our society dictates that professionals continue to 
learn in order to remain abreast of the ever-changing knowledge in their 
field of expertise. Professionals make up more than 25 percent of the U.S. 
workforce and are the primary decision makers for the major institutions 
and establishments of American society.3 The special recognition given to 
professionals is a result of the leadership derived from their technical 
knowledge and skills. Because the public relies on professionals for crucial 
services, lawyers as professionals have a significant amount of control over 
our society. 
As this paper will illustrate, a great amount of racial disparity exists in 
how the law treats individuals. CLE has great potential to educate legal 
practitioners of this disparity and the wide array of ways it is manifested in 
their profession. However, among the forty states mandating CLE, only five 
require coursework addressing bias and discrimination in the profession.4 
Even then, these five states define “bias” in a way that consistently fails to 
adequately address racial bias. Using Critical Race Theory (CRT) as an 
analytical lens to critique CLE offerings, we suggest that the failure to 
realize the aforementioned potential is due to an overall tacit acceptance of 
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racism in the criminal justice system, as well as an interest convergence 
within state bar associations to maintain the status quo. 
First, this article will outline the racial disparities existing in the legal 
profession and the criminal justice system. Next, it will present an overview 
of CRT and its principles before outlining the five sets of state CLE 
requirements regarding bias and discrimination. This is followed by a CRT 
critique of the CLE offerings. We conclude with suggestions for improving 
CLE offerings on bias. These suggestions are (1) a needs assessment for 
each state bar and a corresponding survey of the perceptions of race within 
its legal community, (2) the requirement of racial bias as a separate topic of 
CLE, (3) the development of programs to address a bar’s specific issues 
concerning race, and (4) some measurement of success to gauge a 
program’s effectiveness. 
I. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE LAW 
The significance of legal services in the American economy is evident by 
its continuing growth, especially when compared to the continuing decline 
of the manufacturing sector. At the end of 2005, the U.S. auto and auto 
parts manufacturing industry employed about 1.1 million workers and 
constituted 0.8 percent of our national gross domestic product (GDP).5 By 
contrast, the legal services sector employed nearly the same number of 
people, but contributed to 1.5 percent of the GDP.6 Thus, while the 
manufacturing sector and the legal services sector employed roughly the 
same number of people, the legal services sector contributed nearly twice 
the value to the U.S. economic output.7 
In part, this increase in legal services has been fueled by the astronomical 
increase in the number of criminal defendants. This growth has been due to 
“get tough” political policies, such as the “war on drugs” or the “three 
strikes” laws that many states have adopted. In 1979, drug offenders were 
6.4 percent of the state prison population; in 2004, they were 20 percent.8 In 
federal prisons, drug offenders went from 25 percent of all federal inmates 
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in 1980 to 47.6 percent of all federal inmates in 2006.9 It is interesting to 
note that most drug arrests are for using and not dealing, and although 
African Americans account for only 15 to 20 percent of the nation’s drug 
users, African Americans account for half to two-thirds of those arrested for 
drug offenses in most urban areas.10 Thus, African Americans are being 
targeted as the culprits of the drug problem in America, while those who 
deal drugs—the true culprits—are escaping prosecution. The racial 
demographic breakdown of this increasing prison population is similarly 
alarming: an estimated 40 percent of state jail inmates are Black, 19 percent 
are Hispanic, 1 percent are Native American, 1 percent are Asian, and 3 
percent are of more than one race/ethnicity.11 This means that 74 percent are 
of all state jail inmates in 2006 were People of Color, although they make 
up approximately 32 percent of the U.S. population.12 Nationwide, an 
estimated 16.6 percent of all Black males were imprisoned in 2001 along 
with 7.7 percent of all Hispanic males, compared with only 2.6 percent for 
White males.13 Thus, this increase in the need for legal services is fueled in 
part by the growth of a criminal justice system that apparently engages 
People of Color at a disproportionately higher rate. Some may think this is 
due to higher criminal activity among People of Color, others may consider 
that People of Color are more likely to be racially profiled and stopped for a 
minor offense or for no offense simply because dark skin or an exotic look 
makes them appear suspicious. 
While a variety of sources confirm the racial injustices and 
disproportions occurring in the criminal justice system, state bar 
associations have yet to respond with remedial or educational steps. At least 
twenty-two state task forces have found bias in the legal profession and the 
criminal justice system to such a significant degree as to constitute a serious 
problem.14 This reality serves to undermine public belief and confidence in 
a fair judicial system. Nevertheless, given the relative inaction by state bar 
associations, it appears as if state bars—along with most people—do not 
consider the injustices and racial disproportions now occurring in the 
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criminal justice systems to be problematic. Most people rationalize that 
those who are arrested and prosecuted deserve it—they are criminals who 
deserve their fate and race has little (if anything) to do with it. As such, 
from the perspective of CLE program providers, there is no problematic 
racial bias issue to address through CLE. Consider the following statistics, 
which undeniably speak to the connection between race and the legal 
system: 
• Half of all prisoners in the U.S. (49.4 percent in 1996) are 
African American, despite the fact that African Americans 
represent only 12 percent of the U.S. population.15 
• Two-thirds of all youths confined in local detention and state 
correctional systems are of color even though they account for 
only one-third of the U.S. adolescent population. Between 1983 
and 1997, the number of youths in detention, regardless of race, 
doubled.16 
• The incarceration rate for African American men is seven times 
the rate for White men.17 According to the U.S. Bureau of 
Justice, in 2006 there were 3,042 Black male prisoners per 
100,000 Black males in the U.S., compared to 1,261 Hispanic 
male prisoners per 100,000 Hispanic males and 487 White male 
prisoners per 100,000 White males.18 
• About 40 percent of the people currently on death row and 53 
percent of all the people executed since 1930 are African 
American.19 However, there is not a significant difference 
between races when it comes to crimes that are eligible for the 
death penalty, according to data from the U.S. Department of 
Justice.20 
• African American and Hispanic offenders receive harsher 
treatment than White offenders at every step of the justice 
system, from initial detention to bail to sentencing.21 
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• Judges in many jurisdictions impose harsher sentences on racial 
minorities who murder or rape Whites and more lenient 
sentences on racial minorities who victimize members of their 
own racial or ethnic group. While White women are the least 
likely to be victims of crimes,22 minority perpetrators of crimes 
against them receive harsher sentences. 
Yet, even in the face of such statistics, most state bar associations do not 
address racial bias in their CLE. CLE should help to ensure quality of life 
for consumers of legal services. However, despite the listed statistics and 
the findings of the various task forces, only five of the forty states 
mandating CLE require coursework addressing bias and discrimination in 
the profession.23 
II. CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
The next objective of this paper is to critique the CLE offerings on bias 
using Critical Race Theory (CRT) as an analytical lens in an effort to reveal 
possible reasons for the limited offerings on bias and discrimination in the 
legal profession. The questions that guide this critique are  
1. Why has the legal profession in most states chosen to exclude bias 
and discrimination from its mandated CLE offerings? 
2. In spite of statistics, which indicate that race is a significant issue in 
the legal system, why is race not addressed? and  
3. How are race, discrimination, and bias addressed when these topics 
are included in CLE offerings?  
We will first present an overview of CRT and then detail the various CLE 
requirements that do address race, discrimination, and bias. 
An analysis of the processes that replicate injustice and racism forms the 
basis of CRT.24 For instance, one of the key themes of CRT is that racism is 
ordinary and pervasive.25 The ordinariness of racism means that all those 
who hold power or privilege are racists and do not acknowledge their views 
or actions as racist; rather, they see their views as normal, typical, and part 
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of the status quo. 26 Race is the center of the analysis and it is  used to 
critique educational activities for covert and overt racist policies and 
practices.27 The status quo is further reinforced by the interest convergence 
of White elites (materially, through manipulation of the labor pool) and 
working-class Whites (psychically, by giving them a reason to feel superior 
to People of Color) who work together by subtle (even subconscious) 
consensus to maintain the status quo.28 Therefore, large segments of society 
have little to no incentive to eradicate racism. Richard Delgado and Jean 
Stefancic, two of the chief voices in CRT, argue that most populist 
movements aimed at eliminating racism have failed for this reason.29 
Interest convergence, as explained by critical race theorists, maintains that 
Whites are only willing to change the power differential when there is a 
clear, self-serving benefit. The power held by the White elite results from 
their control of material resources, political office, and capital. Although the 
working class people do not share these resources, they derive psychic 
benefits from the existence of a subordinate racial group. 
The social construction of “race and races [which] are products of social 
thought and relations . . . [and not] biological or genetic reality”30 sustains a 
system of differential racialization. Most scientists and scholars agree that 
the modern day notion of race has no scientific basis. Granted, people with 
common genealogical origins have certain traits in common, such as skin 
color, hair texture and color, and even a biological propensity for certain 
diseases and illnesses; however, such similarities account for only a small 
portion of the total genetic makeup. There is more genetic variation within 
races than between them.31 This fact alone defeats any argument in favor of 
racial scientific classification. However, people take their learned racial 
categories seriously, despite the fact that the U.S. Census Bureau has 
changed its racial categories regularly. Those in charge of creating racial 
classifications have varied from three to thirty-six different races.32 For 
instance, in 1870, the Bureau listed five races (White, colored/Black, 
colored/mulatto, Chinese, and Indian); in 1950, it switched to three (White, 
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Black, and other), and then back to five in the 1990s (White, Black, Asian, 
Hispanic, and Indian).33 Besides these procedural inconsistencies, these 
classifications are also practically inconsistent. White and Black are 
“colors”; Asian represents a large and diverse continent; Hispanic 
represents people of many colors and appearances who are lumped together 
for speaking Spanish; and use of the word “Indian” represents a historical 
mistake. As an example of the effect of this racialization and its 
inconsistencies, while African Americans are overrepresented in the penal 
system, Spanish-speaking people are also increasing in numbers. However, 
this categorization has nothing to do with a genetic conception of race, but 
instead represents the demonization of a group of people according to 
changing social constructions. 
In order to adequately address the inherent nature of racism in our 
culture, CRT demands an approach to social change that is fundamentally 
different from the status quo of liberalism. CRT scholars harshly critique 
liberalism, arguing that liberalism focuses on deliberate, incremental change 
in the legal system and society while circumstances demand radical, 
systemic change. Most CRT scholars agree that liberalism serves to sidestep 
authentic efforts to eradicate racism. Liberal agendas, such as equal 
opportunity, colorblindness, and the role model argument for affirmative 
action, have all failed in their attempt to remedy racism and 
discrimination.34 This is because racism is not an accidental occurrence or a 
simple matter of ignorance that can be remedied with education, exposure, 
or laws designed to eliminate its continued existence. Indeed, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has shattered any hope that the liberal agenda can be 
effective in its goal. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) and City 
of Richmond v. Croson (1989), the Supreme Court struck down affirmative 
action programs or set aside such programs as unconstitutional.35 While 
affirmative action as a concept survived one challenge in the University of 
Michigan’s Law School case (2003), it has been so narrowly tailored as to 
render it without much current significance.36 In the wake of these 
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decisions, most CRT scholars agree that liberal ideology and its focus on 
colorblindness will not have much impact on racism.37 
III. CLE AND BIAS AWARENESS 
While the ABA’s Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of 
Law38 has drafted a model definition which includes minimum 
qualifications for competence, accountability, and access to justice, the task 
force recommended that these factors be balanced to determine who should 
be able to provide services and under what circumstances, leaving each state 
to develop its own definition. The standards for ethics and professionalism 
do not include rules on discrimination or bias when dealing with clients. 
Perhaps as a result, only five of the forty states that mandate CLE 
coursework include the elimination of bias as part of their ethics and 
professionalism requirements. These states are California, Minnesota, 
Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia.39 Furthermore, the task force 
encouraged each state to weigh the factors provided in the report in a 
manner best suited to resolving the harm/benefit equation for its citizens. 
Unsurprisingly then, each state differs somewhat in its requirements for 
anti-bias training. 
California requires twenty-five hours of CLE every three years, including 
at least four hours in legal ethics, one hour in substance abuse 
prevention/detection and treatment, and one hour related to the elimination 
of bias in the legal profession.40 All active members of the State Bar of 
California must comply with these requirements.41 The one hour anti-bias 
requirement must relate to the elimination of bias in the legal profession 
based on (but not limited to): sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national 
origin, blindness or other physical disability, age, and sexual orientation.42 
In this manner, California so broadly defines “anti-bias” that it is more 
likely that the selected CLE experience will not address racial bias. 
Nevertheless, this California CLE requirement was challenged in 
Greenberg v. State Bar of California (2000) on first amendment grounds.43 
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The court ruled that the requirements did not violate a lawyer’s first 
amendment rights in that state because lawyers were merely “passively 
exposed to these subjects, without being compelled to manifest any 
agreement or allegiance to their goals or other political agendas.”44 
Minnesota requires forty-five hours of CLE every three-year period. 
These hours must include three hours of legal ethics and two hours on the 
elimination of bias in the legal profession. Bias in the Minnesota justice 
system was officially recognized in 1993 by the Minnesota Supreme Court 
Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System. This task force found that 
all aspects of the Minnesota justice system “from first contact with the 
police through charging, trial, and sentencing were infected by racial 
bias.”45 Rule 2(I) of the Minnesota CLE Board defines “courses on the 
elimination of bias in the legal profession and in the practice of law” as 
“courses that are directly related to the practice of law that [are] designed to 
educate attorneys to identify and eliminate from the legal profession and 
from the practice of law biases against persons because of race, gender, 
economic status, creed, color, religion, national origin, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.”46 Again, the definition of bias is so broadly defined that 
fulfilling the requirement is possible without taking a course that 
specifically addresses race. Nonetheless, Minnesota attorney Elliot 
Rothenberg challenged the anti-bias requirement in the state’s Supreme 
Court.47 Rothenberg claimed that the mandated CLE requirement amounted 
to “indoctrination” in violation of his first amendment rights.48 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with his argument and allowed the rule 
to stand.49 
Oregon requires forty-five hours of CLE over a three-year period.50 
These hours must include six hours on legal ethics (one of which must be 
on child abuse reporting and three on the elimination of bias).51 New bar 
admittees must complete fifteen CLE credit hours, including ten hours 
addressing practical skills and two hours addressing legal ethics (one hour 
of which must be on child abuse reporting and one hour on the elimination 
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of bias).52 Oregon CLE Rule 3.2(c) allows attorneys to take any CLE course 
that is “designed to educate attorneys to identify and eliminate from the 
legal profession and from the practice of law barriers to access to justice 
arising from biases against persons because of race, gender, economic 
status, creed, color, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.”53 Again, the rule so broadly defines bias that the CLE 
requirement can be met without taking CLE courses that directly address 
the issue of race. 
The state of Washington requires its bar members to take forty-five CLE 
credit hours every three years, of which six hours must be devoted to ethics, 
professional responsibility, professionalism, anti-bias, and diversity.54 At 
least thirty credits must be earned by attendance at face-to-face CLE 
programs, and up to fifteen hours may be earned by self-study.55 Regulation 
101(n) of the Washington State Board of CLE (2008) states that 
professionalism “shall include the issues of and training in diversity, anti-
bias, and substance abuse in order to improve public confidence in the legal 
profession and to make lawyers more aware of their ethical and professional 
responsibilities.”56 While this definition is somewhat inclusive, it still 
allows lawyers to fulfill the requirement without taking CLE courses that 
directly target the issue of race. New bar admittees are exempt from these 
requirements during the year they are admitted and the following year. 
 The state of West Virginia requires twenty-four hours of CLE every two 
years.57 Of the five states that mandate bias awareness as a part of its CLE 
requirements, West Virginia’s rule allows for the broadest definition of the 
term “bias.” CLE rule 5.2 of the West Virginia CLE Rules & Regulations 
simply mandates that “at least three of such twenty-four hours shall be 
taken in courses in legal ethics, office management, substance abuse, or 
elimination of bias in the legal profession.”58 This rule simply gives lawyers 
a choice of whether or not to take such a CLE course. The fact that it is on a 
list which includes office management speaks to the lack of importance 
West Virginia bar policymakers ascribe to the issue. 
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It is interesting to note that, in those states where bias awareness is 
mandated in CLE, bias is so broadly defined so as to make it possible to 
fulfill the requirement without taking courses that address the issue of race 
in the profession and in the criminal justice system. Thus, it can be 
concluded that practicing lawyers are not made aware of the significance of 
race in the criminal justice system and the profession of law in their 
mandatory CLE requirements. Further, none of the five states that mandate 
bias awareness require any assessment of learning outcomes. In other 
words, there is no attempt to determine whether learning has occurred. 
Thus, there is no way to assess the effectiveness of any of the five mandated 
CLE programs. Given that the state bars control the contents of mandated 
CLE, each has the power to begin to raise awareness of the reality of race in 
the legal system through the inclusion of the topic in its requirements. 
IV. A CRITICAL RACE THEORY ANALYSIS 
The legal profession in most states has chosen to exclude bias and 
discrimination from its mandated CLE offerings. This is a startling reality in 
light of the overwhelming statistics that indicate that racial bias is an issue 
in the criminal justice system and in the legal profession. According to the 
American Bar Association (ABA), twenty-two state task forces have found 
bias in the legal profession to be a serious problem.59 Nevertheless, the 
ABA and state bar associations have not responded with decisive policy 
changes targeting racial bias. CRT provides a viable explanation for this 
lack of action by focusing attention on the normalizing effect the justice 
system has on racism. 
Race and racism are a part of the American social fabric. They have been 
woven into its fabric through a unique history that has included slavery and 
the eugenics movement. As such, race and racism are ordinary to everyday 
life in America; they are always present in our society. Indeed, the 
manifestations of racism within the criminal justice system reflect the 
ordinariness of race and racism in the greater American society. That which 
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is ordinary does not stand out as an aberration; it is normal and expected. 
Perhaps because of this normalness, each of the five states that mandate bias 
awareness in their CLE so broadly define bias as to allow practicing 
attorneys to avoid offerings which directly target race (if such offerings are 
in fact available). It is quite likely that this obvious failure to target racial 
bias is not intentional, despite the well-documented impact on the legal 
profession and the criminal justice system. The ordinariness of racism in 
American society renders it invisible to most Whites, including White 
members of the bar. Since racial discrimination is usually viewed as the act 
of a single individual—not a system or conditions created by a system—and 
must be proven by the victim, racial bias or discrimination are hard to prove 
and to see.60 Whiteness as a norm is not critically reflected on in law 
classes, and the role of Whiteness is not considered when evaluating 
equality in the law,61 thus creating a system of dysconscious racism. 
Dysconscious racism is a tacit acceptance of White norms and privileges 
based on an “impaired consciousness or distorted way of thinking about 
race.”62 Questioning racial privilege challenges White identity as the 
benevolent norm. White people as members of the legal profession and 
Black people as clients, inmates, and offenders is a normal and expected 
circumstance. This tacit acceptance of the status quo in the justice system 
may further explain the absence of a sense of urgency to address racial bias 
in CLE and why the issue of bias is so broadly defined. In those five states 
that mandate bias awareness in CLE, the broad definitions and diverse 
offerings render these states’ CLE efforts ineffective with regard to 
addressing racism in the legal profession and the criminal justice system. 
The fact that each of the five states that mandate anti-bias CLE differ 
somewhat in how “bias” is defined is indicative of how race is socially 
constructed to meet the needs of the dominant culture at a given point in 
time. The reality is that race is not a concretely defined classification to 
which individuals are assigned based on scientific criteria. Rather, 
assignment to such classifications is based on shifting social constructions.63 
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“Bias” is defined by each of the five bar associations to meet the needs of 
the practice of law in those states. It is not in the interest of bar associations 
to so narrowly define “bias” so as to solely target race. These bar 
associations have done the politically correct thing by broadly defining 
“bias” to include other forms of discrimination that people in their 
jurisdiction are equally concerned about (if not more concerned about), 
even though these other forms have not manifested themselves in the legal 
profession or in the criminal justice system as pervasively as racial bias. In 
this way, the bar associations have used the politics and policies of 
liberalism to dilute their regulations, thus evading the possibility of 
achieving actual social change on the issue of racial bias. 
In each of the five jurisdictions that mandate bias awareness in CLE 
requirements, “bias awareness” is included as a part of “mainstream” CLE 
offerings. For example, West Virginia offers a CLE course in litigation that 
carries a total of 10.3 West Virginia CLE credits; only 1.2 hours of credit 
from this course are allocated to the mandated ethics requirement.64 As 
such, CLE presenters are only required to address the designated “bias” 
topic for one hour in most cases. For example, a six credit-hour CLE 
offering will typically only require that one hour be devoted to addressing 
the designated targeted area of bias. 
How does such a superficial approach to bias awareness benefit state bar 
associations? Given the weight of the evidence indicating that race impacts 
the criminal justice system and the legal profession, public confidence in 
the profession would erode in the face of obvious silence on this issue. For 
the five states that have mandated anti-bias CLE, they are now able to argue 
that they have acted to protect the dignity of the profession. It is in the 
interest of White bar members to act by responding with some type of anti-
bias CLE. In all likelihood, the primary reason for action is interest 
convergence. The bar associations have acted to protect their own interests, 
not because of sincere concern for the impact of racism in the profession or 
on the greater society. Interest convergence also suggests that the White 
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majority of the bar has something to gain by maintaining an unjust criminal 
justice system. Who benefits from the continual need for legal 
representation for the disenfranchised minority offenders? The U.S. 
economy is primarily devoted to the service sector, with legal services 
accounting for a greater portion of the GDP of the U.S. than the 
manufacturing sector.65 Delgado and Stefancic probe this issue of interest 
convergence and the criminal justice system even further by posing the 
following questions: 
• Does morality-based legislation strengthen solidarity for White 
believers and religious fanatics? Does it help draw lines between 
us and them—saved and unsaved? 
• Do the enormous profits in the privatized prison-building 
industry provide a partial reason? 
• Do felony convictions and disenfranchisement benefit the 
Republican Party by taking Black voters off the rolls? 
• Does Black imprisonment allow for the manipulation of the 
labor pool so that when the job market is weak and Whites fear 
competition for jobs, they can reduce some of the competition?66 
In posing these questions, Delgado and Stefancic suggest that racism in 
the criminal justice system benefits the existing White power structure both 
economically and psychologically.67 Thus, there is a subtle set of incentives 
for White bar members to avoid seriously addressing the issue of race 
within the legal system through CLE, because to do so would threaten their 
interests and the existing beneficial system. 
Perhaps at the heart of the law’s role in interest convergence is the 
reinforcement it provides for the conception of White superiority over 
minority defendants. CRT maintains that society has historically treated its 
defined races (Black, Native American, Hispanic, Asian, etc.) differently 
based on what was needed of the race at a given point in history. Similarly, 
the legal profession is now treating People of Color differently based on 
what society does not want to see from them in the way of crime. In other 
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words, the differential treatment of People of Color in the criminal justice 
system is used to control behavior. This explains the nature of the 
interactions between People of Color, defense attorneys, and prosecutors, 
which is frequently dismissive and condescending towards the minority 
client/offender/accused. In public hearing testimony before the Nebraska 
Minority and Justice Task Force (2004) preceding the issuance of their final 
report, the following testimony was given: 
And now it’s just as bad for young Black women or women of 
color as it is for men . . . to have a public defender who is so 
unprepared, uncaring, and really, unsuitable, to stand before a 
judge, and then you have a prosecutor who comes in . . . and they 
sit at their table and the snickering, the way the attitude that they 
go and handle a case [shows] no respect for the individual or for 
the system.68 
This type of behavior by defense attorneys, public defenders, and 
prosecutors is all too common in the practice of law. Such behavior serves 
to distance People of Color from the criminal justice system and leads to 
feelings of inferiority for People of Color. Defense attorneys also are 
frequently complicit in maintaining feelings of inferiority through their 
condescending interactions with People of Color. Such interactions further 
perpetuate the notion of the accused’s inferiority to the lawyer’s superiority, 
thus allowing the criminal system to be used to exact desired behavior. 
Similarly, prosecutorial and judicial discretion is often used to exact 
desired results from defendants of color. Where criminal behavior is 
especially threatening to White social order, prosecutorial discretion is often 
exerted to the maximum extent allowed by law. For example, In the Atlanta 
courthouse shootings case, State of Georgia v. Brian Nichols, the prosecutor 
refused to plea bargain, arguing the death penalty was appropriate in this 
case because the victims who received the most attention were the judge, 
federal agent, and courtroom reporter; all of whom were White.69 In the 
end, the state of Georgia spent a tremendous amount of money seeking the 
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death penalty, only to ultimately sentence the defendant to life in prison, 
because the jury could not unanimously agree on the death penalty. The 
state could have had the same outcome with the plea bargain of life offered 
originally by the defendant. The prosecutor’s costly actions were the result 
of racial bias. Judges in most jurisdictions impose harsher sentences in 
cases where the victim is White and the defendant is Black or Hispanic, and 
People of Color receive harsher treatment at almost every step in the 
criminal justice process.70 This differential treatment serves as a tool to 
maintain power and control over People of Color and to allow the criminal 
justice system to exact desired behavior from People of Color. CLE could 
be used as a forum to reveal the inconsistencies in cases like Georgia v. 
Nichols as well as the continuing inequities in the criminal justice system 
and prosecutorial discretion; however, to do so would threaten the interests 
of the White power structure in society at large and in the profession of law. 
CRT questions the liberalism that would presumably be a friend in the 
fight for racial justice. CRT is instead suspect of liberalism because its 
effect has historically been to maintain the systems of oppression. For 
example, liberalism has unwavering faith in our adversarial legal system as 
a tool to guarantee racial fairness.71 This faith extends to the ability of voir 
dire to eliminate biased jurors and in the ability of the criminal justice 
system to rehabilitate offenders. This liberal agenda separates the legal 
system from those who populate it and control it, and instead treats it as if it 
is a benign and benevolent actor, which is dangerously idealistic. Therefore, 
in those instances in which liberal bar members agree that CLE should 
address the issue of race, such support is limited to the rehabilitation of 
existing systems. That these lawyers have faith in the existing systems to 
effectively address the issues demonstrates the desire of White liberal 
attorneys to protect their own interests. The reality is that White liberal 
attorneys benefit from the current criminal justice system; this system 
ensures a reliable source of clients for them just as it does for all other 
members of the bar. CLE programs addressing bias have been developed 
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with “liberal” support. These offerings are superficial at best and are often 
allotted a minimal amount of time. Furthermore, CLE offerings on bias are 
often effectively diluted because of optional topic choices. For instance, in 
West Virginia, someone can choose between a course on law office 
management or bias. 
The CLE offerings in the five states with anti-bias CLE requirements are 
not aggressive in targeting and eliminating racism in the profession and the 
criminal justice system. Instead of addressing the elimination of racism, the 
minimal time required is used to address how improvements can be made 
within the current criminal justice structure and the legal profession. These 
programs fall far short of advocating the sweeping change that would be 
needed to target and address racism. 
V. THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Continuing Professional Education (CPE) has become a key strategy in 
securing and maintaining the quality of professional services. CPE may be 
defined as “the process of engaging in education pursuits with the goal of 
becoming up-to-date in the knowledge and skills of one’s profession.”72 
Both the theory and practice of CPE have been fragmented with programs 
being mandated seemingly at a whim, rather than being implemented as a 
result of necessity. Effectiveness is often used as the justification for a 
program but without stating the criteria for evaluating effectiveness. Often, 
CPE that is based on a needs assessment and is contextually relevant can 
produce outcomes such as improved knowledge, skills, and behavior.73 In 
the area of CLE, we can find no examples of stated criteria for evaluating 
effectiveness—assessing learning in context does not seem to be a concern 
for CLE providers. 
In order to begin to address the issue of racial bias in the practice of law 
and in the criminal justice system, each bar association must start with a 
needs assessment. The nature of the bias issue will differ somewhat from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on demography. With this in mind, CLE 
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programs can be uniquely tailored to address regional and state needs. For 
example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, Native Americans make up a 
significant percentage of the minority population. Indeed, their presence so 
taxed the court system that the superior court established a two-track 
system. A separate court was established to hear Native American DUI and 
drug cases—a racially insensitive move on the part of the court.74 Separate 
courts for different races is an application of the failed “separate but equal” 
doctrine. Separate courts for Native Americans sends a message of 
inferiority. The legal profession needs to understand racial differences as 
well as appropriate interactive responses that are based on notions of 
fairness and equality. 
Second, CLE requirements must clearly mandate race as a separate topic 
category with no fewer than three CLE hours required per reporting period. 
The CLE requirement should include racial sensitivity training for all bar 
members, including members of the judiciary. This requirement is 
important because most biased behavior is unconscious. To be fully 
effective, this requirement must then apply to all practitioners; however, 
due to their level of discretion in administering the law, judges and 
prosecutors must be especially included. The practitioners must understand 
their role in perpetuating the racial injustices that currently exist in the 
profession and the criminal justice system. Each state bar should survey its 
practicing attorneys to assess the current perception of race within the 
profession. Differences in perception among attorneys of color and White 
attorneys should be expected.75 Nevertheless, the support of attorneys will 
be important to anti-bias CLE, and this information provides an initial 
indicator of support. 
Last, there must be accountability and a measurement of success. It is 
recommended that each state bar establish a commission of racial equality 
and include among its charges the requirement to track and quantify the 
impact of the mandated CLE anti-bias training on the legal profession and 
the criminal justice system in the state. 
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Liberalism has raised the dilemma between its stated goal of racial 
equality and its reluctance to confront White privilege.76 “Adopting and 
adapting CRT as a framework for educational equity means that [CLE 
decision makers] will have to expose racism in [CLE] education and 
propose radical solutions for addressing it.”77 K.W. Crenshaw, a professor 
at UCLA School of Law specializing in race and gender issues, suggests 
“the development of a distinct political strategy informed by the actual 
conditions of Black people.”78 She contends that liberal ideology has 
visionary ideals that should be developed, because more often than not, 
triumph comes not from insurgency but from resistance and perseverance.79 
To do so, race, racism, and the historic and social context in which they 
operate, should always be at the center of the debate. Continuing legal 
education may lay the foundations for the achievement of educational 
equity by questioning its own assumptions and privileges, by critically 
examining the racial context in which it functions, and by resisting 
stereotyping and profiling within its realm. 
In summary, critical race theorists would argue that the various state bar 
associations have not aggressively addressed the reality of race in the legal 
profession through CLE, because the current state of the criminal justice 
system serves the needs of the dominant culture and of those who hold 
power in the bar associations. Therefore, each state bar needs to take several 
steps to effectuate the change that has been eluded under liberalism. First, it 
must conduct a needs assessment for its state and survey the perceptions of 
race within its legal industry. Then, it must mandate racial bias as a separate 
topic category in CLE requirements and develop programs to address each 
state bar’s specific issues concerning race. 
Last, it must devise some measurement of success in order to gauge 
effectiveness once CLE training has been completed. To accomplish this, 
CLE program planners must abandon the current focus on functionalism 
and embrace a critical focus. The functionalist perspective in educational 
program planning emphasizes the development of technical skills and 
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knowledge.80 A critical perspective will force program planners to 
recognize that the legal profession cannot be understood independent of its 
relationship to the larger society.81 Attorneys are required to attend CLE in 
order to maintain professional knowledge and competency; this has 
historically been the emphasis for CLE requirements in most bar 
associations across the country.82 The emphasis is on the development and 
enhancement of technical knowledge. However, mastery in CLE cannot be 
assessed on the basis of technical expertise alone—we must know the ends 
to which the expertise is being put. Therefore, CLE program planners must 
embrace the critical perspective in program planning. The critical viewpoint 
recognizes the need to deal with both the means and the ends of the 
educational process. Most White attorneys work to maintain the status quo. 
However, in order to address race and racism in the legal system, attorneys 
must understand the ends of their work and the best means to reach those 
ends. 
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